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Abstract
This paper studies the e⁄ect of in￿ ation on welfare in a monetary economy with
price dispersion and consumer search. When facing greater price dispersion with higher
in￿ ation, consumers search harder for lower prices, and increased search raises welfare
by intensifying market competition. Producers post ine¢ ciently high prices, and this
creates a welfare loss. Both mechanisms are a⁄ected by the consumer￿ s monetary bal-
ance. I develop a general equilibrium model with search frictions to incorporate the
interrelationship of money, search, and endogenous price dispersion. In￿ ation a⁄ects
welfare through three channels: the real balance channel, the search channel, and the
price posting channel. I calibrate the model to U.S. data and ￿nd that the welfare
cost of 10% annual in￿ ation is worth 3.23% of consumption; however, if either the
real balance or the price posting channel is closed, the welfare cost signi￿cantly de-
creases to less than 0.15% of consumption. The price posting channel ampli￿es the
welfare-diminishing e⁄ect of the real balance channel, and the aggregated negative ef-
fect exceeds the positive e⁄ect due to the search channel. The search cost only generates
a negligible welfare loss.
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11 Introduction
This paper studies the relationship between anticipated in￿ ation and welfare in an economy
with price dispersion and consumer search. There is a long tradition of thinking that the
welfare cost of in￿ ation is intimately related to the dispersion of prices. A price system trans-
mits necessary information for the allocation of economic resources to be e¢ cient, but with
nondegenerate price distribution this system is jammed by noise due to the indeterminacy of
prices (as described by Friedman, 1977 and Fischer, 1984). Ine¢ cient price levels exist in the
economy, and they create the welfare loss due to resource misallocation. As discovered by a
fair number of empirical studies, price dispersion increases with in￿ ation,1 and so does the
associated welfare loss. This is one channel through which in￿ ation a⁄ects welfare, and the
second channel is consumer search. When consumers face noisier information about prices,
they invest more resources in their search for lower prices. While these resources constitute a
welfare loss since they are not used in producing ￿real goods and services￿ , increased search
behavior can intensify market competition, lower real prices, and increase welfare. The third
channel is real balance. In an economy with in￿ ation, the possession of non-interest-bearing
money constitutes a welfare loss, called the cost of ￿economizing on currency￿by Fischer
and Modigliani (1978), and the monetary balance in real terms also a⁄ects welfare by in-
￿ uencing other channels indirectly. The aggregate e⁄ect of in￿ ation on welfare depends on
the size of the positive e⁄ect through consumer search relative to the negative e⁄ect through
price dispersion, search cost, and real balance. In order to fully understand the welfare im-
plication of in￿ ation and to examine the connections of di⁄erent channels discussed above,
I develop a general equilibrium monetary model with search frictions and incorporate the
1Many empirical studies document a positive relationship between in￿ ation and relative price dispersion.
For example, Parsley (1996) studies quarterly price data from 1975 to 1992 published by the American
Chamber of Commerce Researchers Association and ￿nds that higher in￿ ation is associated with greater
dispersion of relative prices; Debelle and Lamont (1997) also document a robust positive relationship using
annual CPI data for U.S. cities from 1954 to 1986. Similar results are found in studies on other countries,
such as Van Hoomissen (1988), Lach and Tsiddon (1992), and Tommasi (1992). There are some exceptions
including Caraballo, Dabus, and Usabiaga (2006) and Caglayana, Filiztekinb, and Rauh (2008). The former
article shows that the correlation of in￿ ation and price dispersion can become unstable at very high or
extreme in￿ ation, and the latter presents a V-shaped relationship.
2interrelationship of real balance, search, and endogenous price dispersion.
Benabou (1988, 1992) and Diamond (1993) ￿rst study the connection between in￿ ation
and e¢ ciency in a search market with price dispersion, but they abstract away from the
real balance, which is a key element in the analysis since it directly a⁄ects the consumer￿ s
surplus from trade, i.e., the gain from search, and indirectly a⁄ects price dispersion. It is
thus important to model explicitly the cost and bene￿t of holding money. Although there
are various approaches in the literature to proceed, it is natural to apply a framework in
which non-interest-bearing money has value and circulates due to search frictions, because
consumers actually have to search for a trade in the economy with price dispersion. By
attributing the sole reason for holding money to search, I can disentangle the e⁄ect of in￿ ation
on welfare through real balance and search from other exogenous factors. For the same
reason, I also model the consumer￿ s search as the main source of price dispersion, instead of
menu costs or nominal rigidities. Therefore, I integrate the mechanism of price posting and
non-sequential search in Burdett and Judd (1983) into the monetary framework with search
frictions in Lagos and Wright (2005), which has a structure of alternating markets that makes
the analysis tractable. In a recent paper, Head et al. (2010) also apply a similar approach to
explain the micro-foundation of price stickiness and study the frequency and the pattern of
price changes, although they model the consumer￿ s search behavior as exogenous parameters
instead of endogenous variables. In the current paper, I do not discuss the pattern of price
changes, and I have to explicitly model consumer search as a choice due to its important
implications on welfare.
In this model, consumers want to carry a real balance despite a positive opportunity
cost because they can use it as a means of payment in the bilateral market with trading
frictions, in which other kinds of payment are impossible due to anonymity or imperfect
monitoring technology. Prices are posted by producers. Consumers sample multiple prices
non-sequentially and trade at the most preferable price. Their search behavior intensi￿es
competition in the market. If a producer posts a higher price, he gets more pro￿t from one
trade, but it is more likely for a consumer who observes his price and the price of another
3seller not to trade with him, since his price is probably higher. Hence, producers face this
trade-o⁄ between pro￿t per trade and expected trade volume, and this tension generates
endogenous price dispersion in the model.
As discussed above, there are three channels in the model through which in￿ ation a⁄ects
welfare: the real balance channel, the price posting channel, and the search channel. The ￿rst
channel has been extensively studied in the literature on the welfare cost of in￿ ation since
Bailey (1956), while the other two are new, and the aggregated e⁄ect of all three channels
has never been explored before. Consumers carry a smaller real balance when in￿ ation gets
higher and they consume less; thus, welfare becomes smaller. As in￿ ation increases, the
average level of the prices posted by producers may change either way, while price dispersion
keeps increasing. Meanwhile, consumers search more intensively for lower prices and still
have to pay a higher search cost. Therefore, the aggregated e⁄ect of all three channels is
ambiguous, and quantitative analysis becomes necessary.
I calibrate the model to match the annual monetary data of the U.S. and the magnitude
of relative price dispersion from empirical literature. Using the economy with zero in￿ ation
as a benchmark, I ￿nd that the welfare cost of 10% annual in￿ ation is worth 3:23% of the
consumption in the benchmark economy. This ￿nding is signi￿cantly higher than those in
previous literature, such as Cooley and Hansen (1989, 1991) and Lucas (2000), who ￿nd the
welfare cost of 10% in￿ ation is worth less than 1% of consumption and is comparable to
what Burstein and Hellwig (2008) ￿nd in their paper with Calvo pricing. However, if either
the level of real balance or the degree of price dispersion is held constant in the model, the
welfare cost signi￿cantly decreases to less than 0:15% of consumption, which is in line with
the ￿ndings in previous literature.
Following Lagos and Wright (2005), there is another line of monetary literature that
applies models based on search frictions to study the welfare cost of in￿ ation, but there is no
price dispersion in equilibrium. To compare with those ￿ndings, I also calibrate the model
to match a target on markup, and the implied welfare cost is over 10% of consumption,
which is again much higher than 4:6%; the cost reported by Lagos and Wright (2005), and
45:36%; reported by Rocheteau and Wright (2009). Even though bargaining, the source of
welfare loss in those papers, does not exist in this model, the pricing mechanism of posting
and search generates an even greater welfare cost. It is then important to understand the
reason for market ine¢ ciency.
By decomposing the welfare cost of in￿ ation according to the three channels, I ￿nd that
the source of ine¢ ciency resides in the interaction of the real balance channel and the price
posting channel, while the search cost only generates a negligible welfare loss. Due to the
monopolistic power associated with price posting, the average price level is always higher
than the e¢ cient level and mostly increases with in￿ ation. Hence, the existence of price
dispersion ampli￿es the welfare-diminishing e⁄ect of the real balance channel by driving the
consumption and production level even lower. This negative e⁄ect exceeds the positive e⁄ect
due to the search channel, thus generating a big net welfare loss. I also ￿nd a nonmonotonic
relationship between welfare cost and in￿ ation in the model. Initially, the e⁄ect of the
real balance channel is small since consumers still hold a fair amount of money, and the
search channel dominates the other two channels. The welfare cost decreases with in￿ ation,
and the economy approaches the e¢ cient allocation. Before it achieves e¢ ciency, the real
balance channel starts to exert a larger impact on welfare, and together with the price
posting channel, these two channels become the dominant force and drive up the welfare
cost signi￿cantly. This trend prevails until the in￿ ation rate becomes really high for the
economy; then the search channel strikes back and the welfare cost of in￿ ation starts to drop
slightly.
In a recent paper, Head and Kumar (2005) develop a di⁄erent framework to explain
the relationship of in￿ ation and price dispersion and they also study welfare in numerical
examples instead of calibration exercises. They apply the pricing mechanisms in Burdett
and Judd (1983), but they incorporate them into the large household framework in Shi
(1997). Compared to the current paper, they ￿nd di⁄erent relationships of in￿ ation and price
dispersion due to their modeling choices. In their model, the optimal expenditure rule of
an individual consumer has the ￿reservation price￿form, since each consumer only receives
5instructions from the household instead of making optimal decisions. The current paper
allows each consumer to choose his optimal expenditure after observing the transaction price.
This modi￿cation generates a continuous expenditure rule for consumers, and it implies a
di⁄erent price setting strategy of producers. Therefore, the movement of price dispersion
with in￿ ation di⁄ers from Head and Kumar (2005). Another di⁄erence is the alternating
market structure in the current paper. Agents can allocate resources between the centralized
and the decentralized market and gain utility from consumptions in both types of trades,
while in Head and Kumar (2005) monetary trade is the only source of consumption. This
feature of the model causes the consumer￿ s search behavior to di⁄er, and it also generates
di⁄erent implications in the welfare cost of in￿ ation. Finally, they only focus on in￿ ation
levels that are low and moderate relative to the size of the economy, while I also study the
situation in which in￿ ation gets really high.
My paper is also closely related to a recent work by Dutu, Julien, and King (2010). They
study the welfare cost or gain of price dispersion in a model of monetary search with free
entry. Transaction prices are determined by quantity posting, directed search, and auction.
They ￿nd that at low levels of in￿ ation, the welfare of an economy with dispersed prices is
higher than one without dispersed prices, because price dispersion provides consumers with
greater expected surplus from trade and it induces more entry thus more trades.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I lay out the environment
of the model, and I solve for equilibrium in Section 3. Section 4 presents the results of
quantitative analysis, including calibration and a welfare analysis. Section 5 concludes the
paper. Additional technical details and proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Environment
Time is discrete. Each period is divided into two subperiods. In the ￿rst subperiod, there
is a decentralized market in which goods are traded bilaterally. In the second subperiod,
the market is centralized and there is Walrasian trade in the market. A continuum of
buyers and sellers, each with measure 1; live forever. Both buyers and sellers produce and
6consume in the centralized market, but they act di⁄erently in the decentralized market.
Buyers want to consume but cannot produce, while sellers can produce but do not want to
consume. All economic agents are assumed to be anonymous in the decentralized market,
and there is imperfect monitoring technology.2 These assumptions, as well as the lack of
double coincidence of wants, make a medium of exchange, which is called money, essential.
Money is storable and perfectly divisible.
I use Mt to denote the money supply in period t, and I assume it grows according to
Mt+1 = (1+￿)Mt, where Mt+1 is the money supply in the next period t+1. New money is
injected by lump-sum transfers, or withdrawn by lump-sum taxes if ￿ < 0, at the beginning
of the centralized market. For simplicity, I assume that transfer or tax goes equally to each
buyer.3
In period t; the buyer￿ s instantaneous utility function is
U
b
t(xt;ht;qt) = u(qt) + v(xt) ￿ ht;
where qt is the the quantity of the decentralized-market goods consumed, xt is the quan-
tity of the centralized-market goods consumed, and ht is the quantity produced. The





t: I assume that u(0) = 0; u0(q) > 0; and u00(q) < 0 for all q: I also assume
v0(x) > 0 and v00(x) < 0 for all x; and there exists x￿ > 0 such that v0(x￿) = 1: Similarly,
the instantaneous utility of a seller is
U
s
t (xt;ht;qt) = ￿cqt + v(xt) ￿ ht;
where qt; xt; and ht have the same de￿nitions as in the buyer￿ s utility function.4 The lifetime




t : I assume that u0(q) = c holds for some q￿ > 0:
In the centralized market, the price of the consumption good x is normalized to 1; and
the relative price of money in terms of x in period t is de￿ne as ￿t. Hence, the price of xt
2For more discussions on the essentiality of money, please refer to a recent paper by Wallace (2010).
3Alternatively, we can assume that transfer or tax goes equally to each agent or each seller, and equilibrium
results stay the same.
4To simplify the analysis of the model, we assume that the seller￿ s marginal cost of production is constant.
The economic intuition of the results in this paper does not change with more general forms of the cost
function.
7in terms of money is equal to 1=￿t; and for each period, the consumption good becomes the
numeraire in the economy. ￿ is the discounting factor between today￿ s decentralized market
and tomorrow￿ s centralized market. In this paper, I focus on the case in which ￿ < 1 + ￿.
I assume that in￿ ation is forecasted perfectly, and the Fisher equation holds. Hence, the
nominal interest rate i is equal to (1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)=￿; and ￿ < 1 + ￿ implies that i > 0:
3 Search and Price Dispersion
In this section, I consider a particular market structure in which sellers post prices, and
buyers know the price distribution but cannot observe all the prices. Burdett and Judd
(1983) study a similar search protocol in a non-monetary model of indivisible goods. In
this random search environment, buyers have the freedom to sample one or two prices, or
equivalently, to visit one or two sellers with a search cost. They have knowledge about the
price distribution but not about an individual price or an individual seller. Hence, a buyer
cannot direct his search to the seller with the lowest price, and he has to visit a seller without
knowing ex ante exactly what his price is.
Figure 1. Timeline
Figure 1 presents the timeline of the events. At the beginning of the centralized market in
each period, new money is injected or withdrawn by the government. Then, both sellers and
buyers adjust their monetary balances, produce, and consume the centralized-market goods.
After agents enter the decentralized market in the next period, each seller posts prices for
the decentralized-market goods, and he is committed to producing and selling any quantity
8of the goods at the price posted. Every buyer then chooses his search intensity and samples
one or two prices with a certain probability.5 After that, he still needs to decide how much
money to spend in a trade. Finally, each buyer trades with one seller. The seller produces,
the buyer consumes, and then they return to the centralized market.
I allow sellers to use mixed strategies in the price posting stage. The induced price





. Based on the knowledge about Ft, buyers make their decisions on search intensity,
which is a price sampling strategy. I assume that buyers can observe one or two prices. Each
buyer chooses search intensity ￿t 2 [0;1] and pays search cost ￿tk. A bigger ￿t gives the
buyer a higher probability of observing two prices, i.e., he is able to sample two prices with
probability ￿t and sample one price with probability 1 ￿ ￿t.6
I use zt to denote the real monetary balance that an agent carries in period t; and
zt = mt￿t: Starting from this point, I will focus on stationary monetary equilibrium where
aggregate real variables stay constant. This implies that ￿tMt = ￿t+1Mt+1 and ￿t=￿t+1 =
1+￿: The rate of nominal price change, i.e., the in￿ ation or de￿ ation rate in the centralized
market is equal to the money growth rate 1 + ￿: In the decentralized market, the rate of
nominal price change is slightly more complicated due to the existence of price dispersion,
and it may be greater or smaller than 1 + ￿: From this point onwards I will suppress the
time subscript and use ^ to denote the variables of the next period. I also de￿ne W b(z) and
V b(z) as the buyer￿ s value functions in the centralized and decentralized market, respectively,
and W s(z) and V s(z) as the seller￿ s value functions. We proceed ￿rst with the buyer￿ s
optimization problem.
5To ease the presentation, I limit the maximum number of prices that a buyer can sample to be two. In
fact, one can extend the logic of Claim 1 in Burdett and Judd (1983) and prove that in the equilibrium with
price dispersion buyers do not sample more than two prices even if they are allowed to do so. The intuition
is straightforward. Given that the search cost is linear in the number of price samplings while the marginal
gain is decreasing, a buyer either samples just n prices or is indi⁄erent to sampling n or n + 1 prices, but
the equilibrium with price dispersion collapses if n > 2:
6Alternatively, we can assume that each buyer can only make a discrete choice on the number of price
samplings and interpret ￿ as the proportion of buyers who observe two prices. That is more complicated
since we have to keep track of two di⁄erent levels of money holding in equilibrium, while the intuition of the
results remain unchanged.
93.1 Buyer￿ s Optimization









s:t: h + z + T = x + (1 + ￿)^ z
where ^ z is the buyer￿ s real money balance of the next period, and T = ￿￿M is the transfer
payment made by the government. A buyer produces the centralized-market goods using
labor as input, consumes, and adjusts the real balance of the next period. Insert the budget
constraint into the value function by substituting h, and (1) becomes
W
b(z) = z + W
b(0) (2)
where W b(0) = maxx;^ z
￿
v(x) ￿ x + T ￿ (1 + ￿)^ z + ￿V b(^ z)
￿
: The buyer￿ s optimal decision
on the real balance of the next period does not depend on his current money holding. This
convenient result is due to the assumption of a quasi-linear utility function in the centralized
market, which yields a degenerate distribution of buyers￿money holdings in the decentralized
market.



















where d￿(p;z) represents the buyer￿ s optimal expenditure on the decentralized-market goods,
which does not depend on the buyer￿ s search intensity ￿ but relies on his money holding z
and transaction price p. G(p;￿) is de￿ned as
G(p;￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)F(p) + ￿
￿
1 ￿ (1 ￿ F(p))
2￿
;
and it is the distribution of transaction price, i.e., the lower one of two price observations.
With probability 1 ￿ ￿; a buyer samples one price and faces price distribution F(p): With
probability ￿; a buyer samples two prices and faces the distribution of the lower price, which
is 1 ￿ (1 ￿ F(p))
2. After a buyer pays d￿(p;z) for the decentralized-market goods, he still
10carries a real balance of z ￿ d￿(p;z); and W b [z ￿ d￿(p;z)] represents the continuation value
of entering the following centralized market.
In order to solve for d￿(p;z); the buyer￿ s optimal expenditure, we apply the linearity of
















b (z) ￿ ￿k
)
: (4)









s:t: d ￿ z
A buyer chooses how much money to spend on the decentralized-market goods, and he
cannot spend more than what he carries. In order to explicitly characterize d￿(p;z); more
assumptions on the buyer￿ s utility function in the decentralized market, u(q); are required.
In particular, we have the following result on d￿(p;z):
Lemma 1 If the buyer￿ s decentralized-market utility function u(q) has the CRRA form with
risk aversion coe¢ cient ￿,




z; if p < ^ p
d￿(p); otherwise
where ^ p and d￿(p) satisfy u0(z=^ p) = ^ p and u0(d￿(p)=p) = p; respectively, and @^ p=@z < 0;
@d￿(p)=@p < 0:






d￿(p); if p < ^ p
z; if ^ p ￿ p ￿ pR
0; otherwise
where ^ p and d￿(p) are de￿ned similarly, pR satis￿es u(d￿(pR;z)=pR) = d￿(pR;z); and @^ p=@z >
0; @d￿(p)=@p > 0; @pR=@z > 0:




minf~ d;zg; if p ￿ pR
0; otherwise







The risk aversion coe¢ cient ￿ characterizes the buyer￿ s price elasticity of demand. When
￿ is less than one, the buyer￿ s demand elasticity is greater than one, and the expenditure
elasticity is less than one. Then, his expenditure on the decentralized-market goods decreases
when he faces a higher price level. Hence, his expenditure d￿(p;z) decreases as the trading
price rises. A buyer cannot spend more than his monetary constraint at low price levels even
though he desires to. ^ p is the cuto⁄ price level at which the buyer￿ s monetary constraint
starts to unbind, and he spends less than the total amount of money carried when the price
is higher than ^ p: This situation is illustrated in Figure 2a. The above intuition is reversed if ￿
is greater than one, as illustrated in Figure 2b, in which case the buyer￿ s optimal expenditure
increases with the price, and he is constrained at higher price levels. For the remainder of
this paper, I will focus on the case in which the buyer￿ s utility function displays the CRRA
form.
Figure 2. Buyer￿ s Optimal Spending Rule in the DM
Figure 2a. ￿ < 1 Figure 2b. ￿ > 1
12We then plug in the buyer￿ s optimal expenditure rule d￿(p;z) and insert (4) into (2). The
buyer￿ s Bellman￿ s equation in the centralized market now becomes
W
b(z) = z + max
x;^ z;^ ￿
￿














dG(p; ^ ￿) ￿ ￿^ ￿k
)
: (5)
It is obvious that the optimal decision on x does not depend on ^ z or ^ ￿; and it satis￿es
v0(x￿) = 1:
According to Lemma (1), d￿(p; ^ z) has di⁄erent expressions based on the relationship
between p and ^ p: Hence, we need to ￿rst understand the relationship between ^ p and ZF in
order to characterize the buyer￿ s optimal decision on ^ z and ^ ￿:
Lemma 2 In the optimization problem in (5), when ￿ < 1; the buyer always chooses the
real balance ^ z such that ^ p > p; when ￿ > 1; he always chooses to have ^ p < ￿ p:
Proof: see Appendix.
The intuition of Lemma 2 is straightforward. Consider the case of ￿ < 1 as an example. If
the cuto⁄price ^ p is smaller than the lower limit of price distribution, the buyer￿ s real balance
does not a⁄ect the surplus from trade in the decentralized market since d￿(p;z) = d￿(p).
The marginal bene￿t of bringing more money to the decentralized market is zero, while the
marginal cost is still positive. Thus, a buyer wants to reduce his real balance until there is
a positive marginal gain related to the action of carrying money, which only happens when
^ p exceeds p: The intuition is analogous in the case of ￿ > 1:
We proceed to characterize the buyer￿ s optimal decision. Taking F(p) as given, a buyer
chooses ^ z and ^ ￿ to solve the maximization problem in (5). First, we consider the case of
￿ < 1: Knowing that ^ p > p; we can rewrite the buyer￿ s value function in the centralized































dG(p; ^ ￿) ￿ ￿^ ￿k
)
; (6)
and we have omitted the terms unrelated to ^ z and ^ ￿: Therefore, the buyer￿ s optimal real














[1 ￿ ^ ￿
￿ + 2^ ￿
￿(1 ￿ F(p))]dF(p) = i; (7)
where i is the nominal interest rate, de￿ned as i = (1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)=￿ via the Fisher equation,
and ^ ￿
￿ is the buyer￿ s optimal search strategy. We have ^ ￿













(1 ￿ 2F(p))dF(p) = k: (8)
There are two possible corner solutions: if
R ￿ p
p [u(d￿(p; ^ z￿)=p)￿d￿(p; ^ z￿)](1￿2F(p))dF(p) > k;
^ ￿
￿ = 1; if
R ￿ p
p [u(d￿(p; ^ z￿)=p)￿d￿(p; ^ z￿)](1￿2F(p))dF(p) < k; ^ ￿
￿ = 0. Even though ^ ￿
￿ does not
enter (8) directly, it appears in the expression of the price distribution F(p) in equilibrium.
The buyer￿ s marginal gain of holding money, which is the left hand side of (7), decreases
as ^ z￿ increases. Holding everything else constant, there is less marginal gain as a buyer holds
more money. From a partial equilibrium point of view, as the money growth rate increases,
the nominal interest rate rises, the marginal cost of holding money gets bigger, and the
buyer decides to carry a smaller real balance. A smaller real balance makes the gain from
increasing search intensity smaller; thus, the buyer is less likely to sample two prices.
The price distribution F(p) also a⁄ects the buyer￿ s money holding and search strategy
in the following way. If ~ F(p) ￿rst-order stochastically dominates F(p); a buyer carries less
money when facing ~ F(p): Because he faces a market with a smaller probability of getting
a low price, implying a smaller probability of becoming cash constrained and a smaller
marginal gain of holding extra money. Hence, the buyer wants to reduce his money holding
14and to drive up the marginal gain to its original level. When a buyer faces ~ F(p) instead of
F(p); he also wants to invest more in search in order to observe two prices more frequently,
since the marginal gain of observing one more price is larger in the market with a higher
average price level.














[1 ￿ ^ ￿
￿ + 2^ ￿
￿(1 ￿ F(p))]dF(p) = i; (9)
and the equations for ^ ￿
￿ remain the same. The same intuition still goes through. With a
greater i; the opportunity cost of holding money is bigger. As a result, a buyer holds less
money and samples two prices with a smaller probability. We also notice that in both cases
of ￿ < 1 and ￿ > 1; if F(p) is taken as given and both ^ z￿ and ^ ￿
￿ exist, the above conditions
on ^ z￿ and ^ ￿
￿ imply a one-to-one relationship between the two variables. This observation is
formally stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Taking the price distribution F(p) as given and assuming that both ^ z￿ and ^ ￿
￿
exist, there is a one-to-one relationship between the buyer￿ s optimal money holding and his
optimal price sampling strategy.
Proof: see Appendix.
Finally, if ￿ = 1; the decentralized-market utility function has the log form. The buyer￿ s
optimal choice of ^ ￿ is still governed by the same conditions. The optimal real balance is
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This implies that ~ z satis￿es u0(~ z=p)=p ￿ 1 = 1 + ￿ ￿ ￿; and ~ z does not depend on p since
the utility function has the log form. Given that 1 + ￿ > ￿; ~ z is less than ~ d; and ^ z￿ = ~ z:
Therefore, if ￿ = 1; the buyer￿ s optimal expenditure in the decentralized market is equal to
his real balance and does not depend on the prices which he samples.
153.2 Seller￿ s Optimization




[v(x) ￿ h + ￿V
s(^ z)]
s:t: h + z = x + (1 + ￿)^ z (10)
where ^ z is the seller￿ s real money balance of the next period. In the centralized market,
a seller produces and consumes the centralized-market goods and chooses the amount of
money to bring to the next decentralized market.
Similar to the buyer￿ s problem, the seller￿ s optimal quantity of the centralized-market
consumption x￿ satis￿es v0(x￿) = 1: We also have W s(z) = z + W s(0); and the seller￿ s
optimal real balance ^ z￿ does not depend on z.
We then turn to the seller￿ s value function in the decentralized market, which is
V




￿(p) is the seller￿ s pro￿t function, and it does not depend on his money holding. We insert
(11) into (10), and an immediate result for the seller is ^ z￿ = 0 since 1 + ￿ > ￿: The seller
does not bring any money to the decentralized market because he does not want to consume,
and the pro￿t is not a⁄ected by his real balance.
In the decentralized market, a seller takes the buyer￿ s optimal real balance, the optimal
search strategy, and the price distribution in the market as given. He chooses a price to
maximize the following pro￿t function








where z and ￿ represent the buyer￿ s choices in the same period of the seller￿ s price posting
problem, and d￿(p;z) is the buyer￿ s optimal expenditure on the decentralized-market goods.
It happens with probability 1 ￿ ￿ that this seller is the only one whom a buyer visits, and
with probability ￿; he meets a buyer who samples two prices. In that situation, the seller
can have a successful trade only if his price is lower than the other price that the buyer
16observes, which happens with probability 1 ￿ F(p). The seller￿ s surplus from trade is the
di⁄erence between revenue and production cost.
We proceed to characterize the upper and lower limit of F(p): Facing the price distribution
in the decentralized market, the highest price that a seller desires to post must be equal to
or higher than ￿ p; in which case he expects to trade with buyers who only visit him. Hence,
this seller does not face any competition from another seller, and his pro￿t function becomes
￿(￿ p









where ￿ p0 stands for the seller￿ s choice of the upper limit given F(p) and its support ZF,
and F(￿ p0) = 1: The seller chooses ￿ p0 to maximize his pro￿t from trade, and each seller faces
exactly the same problem which does not depend on F(p): Hence, the upper limit of F(p);
￿ p is determined by the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Given the buyer￿ s optimal expenditure rule d￿(p;z), the upper limit of the price
distribution F(p) is given by




~ p ) + ~ p ￿ c = 0; and ^ p is de￿ned
in Lemma 1
(ii) if ￿ ￿ 1; ￿ p = pR; as de￿ned in Lemma 1.
Proof: see Appendix.
If ￿ < 1; the buyer￿ s price elasticity of demand is greater than one, and his expenditure in
the decentralized market decreases with the price level. Thus, a seller posts ~ p; which is less
than the buyer￿ s reservation price, to maximize his pro￿t. This statement is true if a buyer
is not bound by the monetary constraint, i.e., d ￿ z, which happens with relatively higher
prices. However, if the buyer￿ s monetary constraint becomes always binding when in￿ ation
gets very high, the buyer￿ s elasticity of demand becomes one, and the seller de￿nitely posts
a price as high as possible in the feasible range.
17Figure 3. Seller￿ s Pro￿t per Trade in the DM, ￿ < 1
As illustrated in Figure 3, for a price lower than ^ p; buyers are cash constrained, while
for a price greater than ^ p; they have enough money to trade. Therefore, the seller￿ s pro￿t
function in one trade is represented by the lower envelope of the two curves. In this example,
we have ^ p > ~ p: If buyers carry more money into the decentralized market, ^ p decreases, and
it is then possible to have ~ p > ^ p:
The same intuition works with the case of ￿ = 1 because the buyer￿ s expenditure does
not depend on the price. With ￿ > 1; the buyer￿ s expenditure is bound by z at relatively
higher price levels. By posting a higher price, the seller can always lower production cost
and induce the buyer to spend more if his monetary constraint is not binding. Hence, the
seller ends up posting the buyer￿ s reservation price, pR. The next lemma characterizes the
price distribution in the decentralized market.
Lemma 5 Given the buyer￿ s choices on real balance z and search strategy ￿, the price posting
equilibrium distribution F(p) in the decentralized market is uniquely characterized as
(i) if ￿ = 0; F(p) is concentrated at ￿ p:
(ii) if ￿ = 1; F(p) is concentrated at c:
18(iii) if ￿ 2 (0;1); F(p) is nondegenerate and ZF = [p; ￿ p] is connected, and for any p 2 ZF;











where ￿ p is given in Lemma 4 and p satis￿es









If every buyer samples just one price by choosing ￿ = 0, sellers behave like a monopolist,
and they all post a price as high as possible in order to capture all the surplus from trade. If
every buyer samples two prices, each seller who is visited by a buyer faces the competition
from another seller. The seller￿ s price posting game becomes a Bertrand competition, and
in equilibrium, the competitive price, which is equal to the marginal cost, is posted.
If a buyer chooses a search intensity to sample two prices with a positive probability
being less than one, a certain degree of competition is introduced among sellers. When a
single seller decides which price to post, he faces the trade-o⁄ between pro￿t per trade and
expected trade volume. If the seller posts a higher price, he gets more pro￿t from one trade,
but it is more likely for the buyer who observes his price and the price of another seller
not to trade with him. This tension makes sellers indi⁄erent among an interval of prices
and generates a nondegenerate price distribution. If we focus on a symmetric equilibrium
in which all sellers behave the same, each seller then plays a mixed strategy in this price
posting game. He posts price p with probability f(p); and f(p) = dF(p)=dp:
If a buyer searches harder and samples two prices with a higher probability, F(p) in-
creases. The upper limit of the price distribution does not change, while the lower limit
decreases. The price dispersion measured as the length of the support of F(p) increases.
Increased search intensi￿es competition among sellers; thus, it is more likely for a buyer to
get a relatively low price, and in general, the average price level gets lower. If a buyer brings
less money to the decentralized market, ￿ p increases in general, but the e⁄ect on F(p) depends
19on ￿. If the buyer￿ s demand elasticity is greater than one, sellers respond by increasing the
highest price level in the market. Then, by the equal pro￿t condition of sellers, the overall
price level in the decentralized market rises, and F(p) decreases. If a buyer has a demand
elasticity which is less than one, his reservation price in a trade decreases with his real bal-
ance, and the upper limit of the price distribution also drops. As a result, the overall price
level decreases, and F(p) increases.
3.3 Equilibrium
In this section, I ￿rst de￿ne the symmetric stationary monetary equilibrium and then discuss
its existence and properties. In the monetary equilibrium, money bears value and circulates
because buyers can use it as means of payment in the decentralized market with trading
frictions, and sellers may use it in exchange for the consumption goods in the centralized
market. I focus on symmetric equilibrium in the sense that homogeneous buyers and sellers
make identical optimal choices. A formal de￿nition is given in the following, and I have
suppressed the argument of F(p) for simplicity.
De￿nition 1 A symmetric stationary monetary equilibrium (SSME) is a pro￿le fF ￿;z￿;x￿;
h￿;d￿;￿￿g satisfying the following conditions:
1. Given d￿; z￿; and ￿￿; sellers post pro￿t-maximizing prices in the decentralized market
and the resulting price distribution F ￿ is determined by Lemma 5;
2. Given F ￿; d￿; and ￿￿; z￿; x￿; and h￿ solve the buyer￿ s problem in the centralized market;
3. Given F ￿ and z￿; the buyer￿ s optimal spending rule in the decentralized market d￿
satis￿es Lemma 1;
4. Given F ￿; d￿; and z￿; ￿￿ solves the buyer￿ s search problem in the decentralized market:
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(1 ￿ 2F ￿(p))dF ￿(p) > k:
20In general, two kinds of equilibrium may potentially exist: one with a degenerate price
distribution in the decentralized market and one with a nondegenerate price distribution.
Proposition 1 shows that the ￿rst kind of equilibrium does not exist.
Proposition 1 If 1 + ￿ > ￿; there exists no SSME with ￿￿ = 0 or ￿￿ = 1:
Proof: see Appendix.
If all the buyers choose ￿ = 1 and sample two prices in an SSME, the equilibrium price
distribution becomes degenerate and concentrated at the marginal cost. Then, the marginal
gain from increasing search intensity is zero for the buyer, but he has to pay a positive search
cost. As a result, the buyer has an incentive to deviate from sampling two prices and simply
chooses ￿ = 0 to observe one price without any cost. The equilibrium collapses.
If all the buyers sample just one price, the equilibrium price distribution again becomes
degenerate and concentrated at the highest possible price posted by the seller, which is just
the monopoly price since sellers are not competing against each other. When sellers post the
monopoly price, they do not consider the buyer￿ s opportunity cost of holding real balance.
Hence, when a buyer decides how much money he should bring from the centralized market
to the decentralized market, he always ￿nds that the marginal cost of carrying real balance
is bigger than the marginal gain because the cost due to a positive nominal interest rate
is sunk at the time of a decentralized-market trade. Therefore, the buyer￿ s optimal money
holding must be zero, and it cannot be a monetary equilibrium.
Concerning the existence and uniqueness of an SSME with a general CRRA utility func-
tion in the decentralized market, when I actually compute the model, I always ￿nd that
there exists a unique equilibrium as long as the net money growth rate ￿ is less than an
upper bound ￿ ￿. The upper bound ￿ ￿ depends on the search cost k; and ￿ ￿ becomes smaller
with a greater search cost. The intuition is straightforward. As ￿ increases, the opportu-
nity cost of holding money gets bigger, and the buyer carries less money; hence, he gets a
smaller marginal gain from increasing search intensity. If the buyer￿ s gain from search gets
even smaller than the search cost, every buyer will choose to sample just one price, and the
21equilibrium with a nondegenerate price distribution collapses. If the search cost gets bigger,
buyers will choose to stop investing in search at an even lower level of in￿ ation. I will discuss
more about equilibrium and the e⁄ect of in￿ ation on welfare in the next section.
4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, I ￿rst solve the model numerically and calibrate the parameters to match
money demand and price dispersion in the data. Then, I calculate the welfare cost of in￿ ation
and compare the ￿ndings with those in previous literature. I also decompose the in￿ uence of
in￿ ation on welfare and identify the di⁄erent e⁄ects through three di⁄erent channels. Finally,
I check the robustness of the results and seek to understand the relationship between the
welfare cost of in￿ ation and the magnitude of price dispersion.
4.1 Calibration
I follow the literature and consider the following functional forms for preferences and technology:
CM : U(x) = Alogx ￿ h
DM : u(q) = B
(q+b)1￿￿￿b1￿￿
1￿￿ and c(q) = cq
where ￿ > 0 and b > 0: I include b in the decentralized-market utility function in order to
make u(0) = 0 when ￿ > 1: I set b ￿ 0 so that the relative risk aversion coe¢ cient of u(q);
which is equal to ￿q=(q+b); is approximately ￿. The utility function in the centralized market
is standard, following the literature since Cooley and Hansen (1989). Because both the
parameters A and B characterize the relative size of the centralized-market trade versus the
decentralized-market trade, I normalize B to 1: Finally, I set the marginal cost of production
in the decentralized market equal to one, i.e., c = 1 in c(q); so that the cost of labor is the
same in both markets.
We need to calibrate three key parameters of this model, the preference parameters ￿
and A; and the buyer￿ s search cost k: First, I set k to target some statistics measuring the
degree of price dispersion from the empirical literature. The search cost a⁄ects the buyer￿ s
22decision on search intensity and the probability of sampling two prices. If k is high, a buyer
invests less in search and is more likely to observe one price. There is less competition in the
decentralized market, and the price distribution is less dispersed. This connection between
search cost and price dispersion helps us to calibrate k: Second, I calibrate A to match the
money demand, L = M=PY; at the average nominal interest rate. The real balance M=P
is proportional to the total real output Y with a factor of proportionality L; which depends
on the opportunity cost of holding money. In the model, the per capita real output in the
centralized market is x￿ = A; and the per capita real output in the decentralized market is
R ￿ p












For the same level of the nominal interest rate, if A increases, the real output in the cen-
tralized market and the total real output get larger, and the money demand decreases. This
relationship determines A: Finally, since the money demand is a function of the nominal
interest rate, i.e., L = L(i); I calibrate ￿ to ￿t the model-generated money demand curve to
the money demand observations from real data.
The time period is one year. I choose this length of time in order to compare the results
with those in previous studies, and also because of the availability of data. I use a data
sample of 101 years, from 1900-2000. I use data on the nominal GDP for PY; M1 for M; and
the short term (6 month) commercial paper rate for i:7 Concerning the calibration target for
search cost k, there are many empirical studies in which the magnitude of price dispersion








where Ri = log(pi=￿ p):8 In their paper, Debelle and Lamont (1997) ￿nd an average RPV of
0:035 at the annual in￿ ation rate of 4:3%, and I use it as the target for k in the baseline
7The data is available in Craig and Rocheteau (2006). For a detailed description of the data source,
please refer to Appendix 2 in their paper.
8There is an alternative de￿nition of RPV, which is RPVi;t =
hR ￿ p
p (Ri;t ￿ ￿ Rt)2dF(p)
i 1
2
; where Ri;t =
23calibration. Finally, I set ￿ to match an annual real interest rate of 4%: This completes the
baseline calibration.
In order to see how the calibration results vary with di⁄erent target values, I also use
another target from Parsley (1996) for price dispersion, and it gives an average RPV of
0:0923 at the annual in￿ ation rate of 5:3%: I also consider di⁄erent calibration strategies to
check the robustness of the results. As a very common approach in the literature, the search
cost is calibrated to match the average markup in the decentralized market. I consider the
value of the markup to be 30% at an annual nominal interest rate of 5:46%, which is about
the average value in the empirical evidence discussed in Faig and Jerez (2005) and also used
in Aruoba, Waller, and Wright (2010):9 When I present the calibration results, I report the
implied markup in the aggregate economy of both markets as well.
I also consider another calibration strategy for the preference parameter ￿: Instead of
matching the money demand function to real monetary data, I match the estimated elasticity
of money demand with respect to the nominal interest rate. Following the literature (e.g.,
Goldfeld and Sichel, 1990), I estimate the interest elasticity using the following equation
lnzt = ￿0 + ￿1 lnit + ￿2 lnyt + ￿3 lnzt￿1 + ￿t;
where zt and zt￿1 are real money balances, it is nominal interest rate, and yt is real output. I
assume that the residual ￿t follows an AR(1) process, i.e., ￿t = ￿￿t￿1+"t; and "t is a serially
uncorrelated random error with mean zero and constant variance. I use the Cochrane-Orcutt
procedure to correct the autocorrelation problem. I ￿rst estimate the interest elasticity ￿1
from the data, which is ￿0:0806. Then, I estimate the interest elasticity again using the
data series generated by the model and choose ￿ to match the model generated elasticity
with ￿1:10
log(pi;t=pi;t￿1): Tommasi (1992) ￿nds similar e⁄ects of in￿ ation on price dispersion using both measures,
and Parsley (1996) shows that the two measures are actually comparable. In this paper, we are not able to
calculate RPVi;t because the model does not generate the path of each individual seller￿ s price changes.
9This data on markup is from the Annual Retail Trade Survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau,
which is collected in the format of ￿rm surveys. We are not claiming that the retail market is a real economy
counterpart of the decentralized market in the model, but this is the best available data we can get. The
average rate of annual in￿ ation for the period covered in the sample is 5.46%.
10Concerning the data required for this exercise, I still need the series of real GDP and price index. The
24In order to numerically solve the model, we ￿rst take the buyer￿ s choice of ￿￿ and z￿ as
given and compute the uniquely determined price distribution F ￿ using Lemma 5. Then, we
plug F ￿ into (7) and solve for z￿ as a monotonic function of ￿￿: Finally, we insert both F ￿
and z￿ into (8) and search for the ￿￿ 2 (0;1) that solves the equation.
4.2 Results
Table 1 summarizes the results of the baseline calibration. Besides the calibrated parameters,
I also report the implied decentralized-market markup at the average money growth rate ￿DM
and the overall markup of both markets ￿.
Table 1. Baseline Calibration
￿ k A ￿ ￿DM ￿
0.9615 0.0043 0.4916 0.1181 9.72% 2.4%
The markup in the decentralized market is de￿ned as ￿DM =
R ￿ p
p (p=c ￿ 1)dF(p); and
the markup in the centralized market is simply one. The overall markup is the average of
the two weighted by the shares of total output produced in each market. In the baseline
calibration, about 25% of the total real output is produced in the decentralized market.
The baseline calibration yields a value smaller than one for the preference parameter ￿:
In fact, this result holds in all the calibrations that I do in this paper. The reason is that ￿
determines the shape of the utility function in the decentralized market, hence, the shape of
the money demand function generated by the model. If ￿ is big, the utility function shows
much curvature and is far from being linear. The money demand from real data does not
have much curvature, and this implies a small ￿:
Figure 4 presents the model-generated money demand curve, which informs us of the
￿tness of the model. Another way to check the model￿ s ￿tness is to use regressions to ￿nd
the e⁄ect of in￿ ation on price dispersion measured by RPV and to compare the coe¢ cient
real GDPs before 1930 are from the Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970 (1970);
and they are adjusted to chained 2005 dollars. From 1930 to 2000, it is from the FRED database managed
by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. I use CPI data for the price index. Before 1913, it is again from
the Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970 (1970), adjusted to chained CPI in
1982-84 being 100, and from 1913 to 2000, it is from the FRED database.
25of the model with what is found in the empirical papers mentioned above. I ￿nd that this
model implies a coe¢ cient of 0:2784; and the range of this coe¢ cient found in Debelle and
Lamont (1997) is from 0:115 to 0:393: The model does a good job of ￿tting the targets of
real data on money demand and price dispersion.
Figure 4. Money Demand: Model and Data
In the baseline calibration, the model has a unique SSME with those parameters. I have
always found a unique equilibrium with all the di⁄erent parameter values in this paper. I
also found that as in￿ ation increases, the buyer￿ s optimal real balance decreases. As the
opportunity cost of holding money gets bigger, a buyer tends to lower the amount of the
real balance that he brings to the decentralized market so that the marginal gain of holding
money increases to compensate for a larger cost. As a buyer brings less money, his surplus
from trade in the decentralized market decreases, and this lowers his probability of sampling
two prices. On the other hand, the degree of price dispersion generated by price posting
increases, and it gives a buyer a greater incentive to increase search intensity. These two
forces are put together in the general equilibrium analysis. In equilibrium, a buyer searches
more with higher in￿ ation, and the price dispersion e⁄ect dominates the real balance e⁄ect.
26Figure 5 illustrates the relationship of in￿ ation and the magnitude of price dispersion
measured by RPV, and the equilibrium paths of the upper and lower limit and the average
price level of F ￿. Because the calibration exercise generates ￿ < 1; the buyer￿ s price elasticity
of demand is greater than one. As a buyer brings less money with him at higher in￿ ation,
his expenditure in the decentralized market decreases and starts to be bound by his real
balance. With ￿ < 1; a lower level of expenditure corresponds to a higher level of the upper
price limit ￿ p; which is not a⁄ected by the buyer￿ s price sampling strategy. Hence, ￿ p increases
with in￿ ation, and this is a force that drives up the overall price level. On the other hand,
a buyer chooses to sample two prices with a higher probability, and this drives down the
overall price level. As a result of the two competing forces, the equilibrium price distribution
becomes more dispersed as measured by RPV, as presented in Figure 5a.
Figure 5. Price Dispersion
Figure 5a. Price Dispersion Figure 5b. Price Levels
In the baseline calibration, the upper bound on in￿ ation ￿ ￿ is about 14%, and there
exists no equilibrium with a nondegenerate price dispersion if ￿ is more than ￿ ￿: As in￿ ation
approaches the upper bound, every buyer samples two prices with a very high probability.
This induces intensive competition among sellers and drives the price dispersion smaller. The
prices in the decentralized market are more concentrated on lower levels, and the buyer￿ s
marginal gain of carrying money gets bigger.
27Figure 5b shows the movements of the average price level and the upper and the lower
limits of the price distribution. When ￿ is small, a buyer still carries enough money so that
he is only constrained at lower levels of prices, and at those prices he desires a consumption
level higher than what he can a⁄ord. The search e⁄ect now dominates the real balance
e⁄ect, and as a result, the average price level decreases, and the price distribution gets more
dispersed. As in￿ ation keeps increasing, the real balance e⁄ect becomes more signi￿cant
at lower levels of z; since utility changes faster at lower levels of consumption. Hence,
the real balance e⁄ect quickly dominates the search e⁄ect and drives up the average price
level. Now a buyer carries even less money, and he is constrained at all the prices in the
decentralized market. He continues to increase search intensity and to sample two prices
with a higher probability, and this again drives down the average price, eventually the entire
price distribution. If the money growth rate keeps increasing, the monetary equilibrium with
nondegenerate price distribution ￿nally collapses because the marginal gain from increasing
search intensity cannot cover the search cost.
In Table 2, I report the calibration results using alternative targets. In the case of Target
2, I use the other price dispersion statistics from Parsley (1996). Target 3 represents the
decentralized-market markup, which I use to calibrate the search cost instead of RPV. In
the case of Target 4, I use interest elasticity instead of money demand to calibrate ￿:
Table 2. Calibration: Alternative Targets
Baseline Target 2 Target 3 Target 4
k 0.0043 0.0328 0.0057 0.003
A 0.4916 1.0134 0.5064 0.3309
￿ 0.1181 0.5326 0.2111 0.1005
￿DM 9.72% 47.13% 25.64% 12.21%
￿ 2.4% 8.75% 5.52% 2.95%
We ￿rst compare column 1 with column 2. With a bigger target on price dispersion,
i.e., the price distribution is more dispersed, I get a larger search cost k and a bigger A: If a
buyer searches harder, price dispersion gets smaller. Hence, a larger price dispersion implies a
higher search cost and less competition in the decentralized market, hence, a bigger markup
28for sellers. As a result, more transactions occur in the centralized market, thus implying
a larger A: The ￿ndings are similar if we compare the baseline calibration with the third
column, which has a bigger target on markup. In the next section, I will further discuss the
di⁄erent targets of price dispersion and their implications on the welfare cost of in￿ ation.
Finally, when we look at column 4, we do not see a very di⁄erent result from column 1; thus,
it does not make a big di⁄erence to target interest elasticity rather than money demand.
4.3 Welfare Cost of In￿ ation
Following the literature, I study the welfare cost of increasing in￿ ation from a stationary
annual in￿ ation rate of zero percent to ￿ percent. First, I use the parameters reported in the
previous section to compute the welfare in the equilibrium with zero in￿ ation, which is the
sum of trade surplus in both markets. Then, I compute the welfare of the new equilibrium
with a di⁄erent in￿ ation rate of ￿. I ask how much agents would be willing to increase
or decrease their consumption in the benchmark equilibrium with zero in￿ ation in order to
make them indi⁄erent to the two economies.
For any ￿; the equilibrium welfare is given by


















where 2[v(x￿) ￿ x￿] is the total trade surplus from the centralized market, and the second
integral term is the surplus from trade in the decentralized market, subtracting the expected
cost of sampling two prices. We can also write the equilibrium welfare at zero in￿ ation with
a reduced consumption level in both the centralized and decentralized market by a factor ￿
as


















I measure the welfare cost of ￿ percent in￿ ation as the value ￿0 that solves W(￿) = W￿0(0):
Each economic agent would need to give up 1￿￿0 percent of his consumption to be indi⁄erent
to the two economies with di⁄erent in￿ ation rates. The results on the welfare cost below
29focus on ￿ = 10%; i.e., I consider the welfare cost of 10% in￿ ation versus zero in￿ ation, and
I also show a graph of welfare cost at di⁄erent levels of in￿ ation in the baseline calibration.
Table 3. Welfare Cost of 10% In￿ ation
Baseline Target 2 Target 3 Target 4
1 ￿ ￿0 3.23% 8.31% 7.23% 3.25%
Table 3 shows the welfare cost of in￿ ation under di⁄erent calibration targets. In the
baseline calibration, I ￿nd that the welfare cost of 10% in￿ ation is worth 3:23% of consump-
tion in the benchmark economy with zero in￿ ation. We notice that the model generates a
relatively higher welfare cost compared to earlier ￿ndings by Cooley and Hansen (1989,1991)
and Lucas (2000), and the magnitude is slightly smaller than those reported by Lagos and
Wright (2005), Craig and Rocheteau (2006), and Rocheteau and Wright (2009). However, if
I recalibrate the model, in particular the search cost k; to target an average markup of 10%,
which is the target for the bargaining power used in those papers with search frictions, the
welfare cost of 10% in￿ ation is as high as 13:26%.
Table 4. Shorter Sample (1959-2000)
Baseline Target 2 Target 3 Target 4
k 0.0089 0.033 0.0061 0.0062
A 1.1841 1.5488 0.6175 0.8702
￿ 0.1861 0.5262 0.2200 0.1441
￿DM 8.34% 45.14% 35.32% 9.96%
￿ 1.42% 5.78% 4.79% 1.67%
1 ￿ ￿0 2.34% 5.08% 6.68% 2.69%
Table 4 reports similar experiments when I ￿t the model to a shorter sample from 1959
to 2000. In general, the calibration results do not change much, and the welfare cost of
in￿ ation stays in the same range. By comparing it with Table 2, we notice that both the
search cost k and the centralized-market preference parameter A are relatively higher when
I use the shorter sample, while the decentralized-market preference parameter ￿ does not
change much. Although it is now more costly to search in the decentralized market, in which
both trade volume and consumption level are low, agents can switch to consume more of the
30centralized-market goods, and their aggregate utility from consumption does not necessarily
decrease. Because the share of centralized-market trade is much higher than before, the
welfare cost of in￿ ation actually becomes smaller.
Those studies with bargaining as the pricing mechanism usually get a high welfare cost
of in￿ ation due to the holdup problem. A buyer who carries money is making an investment
in the decentralized-market trade, and the investment cost is the cost of holding money due
to a positive nominal interest rate. He cannot get the full return on his investment, i.e., the
entire surplus from trade, unless his bargaining power is equal to one. The current model
does not have bargaining, but the holdup problem still exists and gets more severe with
higher in￿ ation. A seller possesses monopolistic power as he posts prices. He can actually
post a price level higher than the marginal cost, and a buyer cannot gain full surplus from a
trade. If buyers cannot choose search intensity and observe only one price, we cannot have
an equilibrium in which sellers post prices higher than the marginal cost, and in fact, there
exists no monetary equilibrium as is proven in Proposition 1. When a buyer starts to search
and to observe two prices with a certain probability or when a proportion of buyers start
to do so, a seller can mix high price postings with low prices, and the buyer is still going
to carry money and trade in the decentralized market. This is because the small surplus
from a trade when the buyer observes only one high price is compensated by the big surplus
when he samples two prices and trades at a low price level. As a result, the average price
in the decentralized market is always higher than the marginal cost, as shown in Figure 5b,
and buyers only get partial trade surplus. As in￿ ation increases, sellers respond by posting
even higher prices, which makes the buyer￿ s share of total trade surplus even smaller. Hence,
equilibrium is driven away from the e¢ cient allocation by the seller￿ s monopolistic power.
This is the source of ine¢ ciency in our model. As we grant buyers the freedom to sample
more than one price, which could potentially yield a welfare gain, sellers are automatically
given the monopolistic power to post prices higher than the e¢ cient level, which makes all
agents in the economy even worse in terms of a higher welfare cost of in￿ ation.
There are three main channels through which in￿ ation a⁄ects welfare in this model.
31When in￿ ation increases, a buyer carries less money into the decentralized market; hence,
there is less consumption and welfare decreases. I call this the real balance channel. Second,
as a buyer carries less money, a seller responds by increasing the highest price level since the
buyer￿ s demand elasticity is smaller than one, and this is a force that drives up the average
price. A higher average price level then drives down consumption and welfare. I name this
the price posting channel. Third, the price dispersion in the decentralized market increases
as a seller raises the highest price level, and this induces a buyer to search harder, i.e., to
sample two prices with a higher probability. This force drives down the actual transaction
price in a trade, hence, more consumption and higher welfare. I call the last one the search
channel. In order to understand the aggregate and individual e⁄ects of the three channels,
we ￿rst see how welfare cost changes with in￿ ation and then decomposes the cost to identify
the impact of each channel.
Figure 6. Welfare Cost of In￿ ation
Figure 6 illustrates the welfare cost at di⁄erent levels of in￿ ation, with and without search
cost, in an economy with parameters from the baseline calibration. There are three features
to notice about this graph. First, it is welfare-improving to have a small deviation from
the Friedman rule. Even if we run de￿ ation in the economy and make the opportunity cost
32of holding real balance very close to zero, the seller￿ s monopolistic power discussed above
still functions. In that situation, a buyer carries almost as much money as possible, and he
is barely subject to the monetary constraint in the decentralized market. Because he still
has an incentive to search for a low price, there is still price dispersion, and a seller still
posts prices higher than the marginal cost of production. If we deviate from the Friedman
rule and increase in￿ ation a little, the average price drops and welfare increases. At very
low levels of in￿ ation, the positive e⁄ect from the search channel dominates the negative
e⁄ect from the real balance and the price posting channel. However, as in￿ ation keeps
increasing and the buyer￿ s real balance keeps decreasing, the e⁄ect of in￿ ation on welfare
through the latter two channels becomes bigger. As a result, welfare cost keeps increasing,
but at a decreasing rate. As a buyer samples two prices more and more frequently, in the
end, the search channel dominates again and imposes a larger e⁄ect on welfare. The price
dispersion in the decentralized market decreases, and the price distribution is driven toward
the marginal cost. Therefore, the e⁄ect of in￿ ation on welfare is nonmonotonic. This is
the second noticeable feature about Figure 6. Finally, the solid line represents the welfare
cost including the search cost, and the dashed line stands for the welfare cost excluding the
search cost. Apparently, the cost of search only generates a negligible welfare loss.
In order to understand the impact of each individual channel, I proceed to decompose
the welfare cost of in￿ ation through the three channels by the following exercise. Using the
parameters in the baseline calibration, I solve the equilibrium of the model at di⁄erent levels
of in￿ ation. Then, I keep the equilibrium paths of two channels but hold the third channel
at a constant level so that I am able to isolate the contribution of the third channel by
comparing the resulting welfare cost of in￿ ation with the original value.
I start with the real balance channel and keep ￿ and F at their equilibrium values. First,
I solve for the buyer￿ s optimal money holding ￿ z in the equilibrium with a money growth rate
very close to the Friedman rule. Using it as the benchmark value of real balance, I replace
the equilibrium path of z with a constant ￿ z, and calculate the welfare cost for di⁄erent levels
of in￿ ation. The dashed line in Figure 7a shows the welfare cost of in￿ ation when I hold
33real balance constant, and the solid line is the original welfare cost function. The di⁄erence
between the two lines represents the contribution of the real balance channel to welfare
cost when other endogenous variables stay at the equilibrium level. In particular, if a buyer
carries the benchmark real balance instead of the equilibrium level, the welfare at 10% annual
in￿ ation can decrease from 3:23% to 0:04% of consumption. Similarly, Figure 7b shows the
di⁄erence of welfare cost when I hold the price distribution F constant at the benchmark
value, and the welfare cost at 10% in￿ ation can decrease to 0:15% of consumption. We
notice that the welfare cost of in￿ ation becomes negligible if either the real balance or the
price distribution is held constant, and the numbers are in the range of previous estimates
in Cooley and Hansen (1989, 1991) and Lucas (2000). Therefore, the price posting channel
ampli￿es the welfare-diminishing e⁄ect of the real balance channel, and the coexistence of
the two channels induces a large welfare cost.
The impact of the search channel is illustrated in Figure 7c, and we can observe a welfare
gain of 0:1% of consumption at 10% in￿ ation. This implies that the gain from search is even
less than the welfare loss due to search cost. However, the small positive number does not
imply a trivial e⁄ect of the buyer￿ s search behavior on welfare. We revisit the equilibrium
welfare equation (13) and notice that the search intensity ￿ a⁄ects the total welfare both
directly and indirectly. ￿ directly determines G(p;￿), but it also indirectly a⁄ects the buyer￿ s
money holding z and the price distribution F: The above exercise of holding ￿ constant can
only isolate the direct contribution of the search channel to welfare, but not the indirect
contribution. Figure 7d presents the result from another exercise in which I shut down the
search channel instead of holding the value of ￿ constant. I force every buyer to sample
two prices with a given probability, allow each agent to make all other choices, and resolve
equilibrium at di⁄erent levels of in￿ ation. The solid line still represents the welfare cost in
the original economy, and the dotted line shows the welfare cost after I shut down the search
channel, in which case I ￿nd that the welfare cost of 10% in￿ ation increases to 6:99% of
consumption. That is the total e⁄ect that search exerts on the welfare of the economy.
34Figure 7. Welfare Cost Decomposition
Figure 7a. Fixed Real Balance Figure 7b. Fixed Price Distribution
Figure 7c. Fixed Search Intensity Figure 7d. Shut Down Search Channel
Finally, I discuss the relationship between the target of price dispersion and the welfare
cost of in￿ ation. I recalibrate the model to two other arti￿cial targets of price dispersion by
varying RPV to be 0.06 and 0.1 at the same rate of annual in￿ ation, 4:3%. Table 5 shows
the calibration results and the welfare cost of 10% in￿ ation for di⁄erent targets of RPV.
We can see that with a bigger target on price dispersion and everything else being con-
stant, the calibrated search cost, the markup in the decentralized market, and the welfare
cost of in￿ ation all become higher. More dispersed price distribution implies decreased search
in the decentralized market; hence, the cost of search k has to be higher. Then, a seller pos-
35sesses more monopolistic power, and the equilibrium allocation is farther away from being
e¢ cient. In response to a bigger search cost, the output in the centralized market gets larger,
which implies a bigger A; and buyers and sellers consume more centralized-market goods to
compensate for the smaller surplus from trade in the decentralized market. A larger RPV
target also implies a bigger ￿: A buyer has a smaller demand elasticity in the decentralized
market, and it is more di¢ cult to substitute the decentralized-market consumption by con-
sumption from the other market. All these factors connect a larger RPV target to a higher
welfare cost of in￿ ation.
Table 5. Price Dispersion and Welfare Cost
RPV 0.035 0.06 0.1
k 0.0043 0.0072 0.0362
A 0.4916 0.5396 1.0373
￿ 0.1181 0.3256 0.6091
￿DM 9.72% 55.14% 72.75%
￿ 2.40% 9.62% 11.52%
1 ￿ ￿0 3.23% 12.72% 15.40%
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I develop a general equilibrium monetary model with search frictions and
incorporate the interrelationship of real balance, search, and endogenous price dispersion. I
quantify the welfare cost of anticipated in￿ ation and study di⁄erent channels through which
in￿ ation a⁄ects welfare. Calibrating the model to match the annual monetary data of the
U.S. and the magnitude of price dispersion, I ￿nd that the welfare cost of 10% annual in￿ ation
is worth 3:23% of the consumption in the benchmark economy with zero in￿ ation, which is
larger than the previous ￿ndings in the literature. However, if either the real balance or the
price distribution is held constant, the welfare cost signi￿cantly decreases to less than 0:15%
of consumption.
I identify three channels in the model through which in￿ ation imposes an impact on
welfare: the real balance channel, the price posting channel, and the search channel. The
￿rst channel has been extensively studied in the literature, and it generally yields a negative
36but small e⁄ect on welfare. It potentially improves welfare to allow buyers to invest in
search intensity and to seek the most preferred terms of trade. Search intensi￿es competition
in the market and generates a welfare gain larger than the accompanying loss due to the
search cost. However, as buyers start to observe more than one price, sellers are granted the
monopolistic power to post di⁄erent price levels, which are even higher than the e¢ cient level,
i.e., the marginal cost. I ￿nd that due to the existence of price dispersion, the price posting
channel ampli￿es the welfare-diminishing e⁄ect of the real balance channel by driving the
consumption level even lower, and this negative e⁄ect exceeds the positive e⁄ect generated
by the search channel. Therefore, the source of ine¢ ciency in our model resides in the
interaction of the real balance channel and the price posting channel. Depending on the
magnitude of the negative e⁄ect relative to the positive e⁄ect at di⁄erent levels of in￿ ation,
I ￿nd a nonmonotonic relationship between welfare cost and in￿ ation.
This model endogenously generates a nondegenerate price distribution. The degree of
price dispersion ￿rst increases with in￿ ation and then decreases when in￿ ation gets extremely
high for the economy. This nonmonotonic relationship is consistent with the empirical ￿nd-
ings discussed in the introduction of this paper. Instead of using the average market markup,
a standard target in the literature to calibrate bargaining power and search cost, I adopt a
new target on price dispersion, relative price variability, to calibrate the buyer￿ s search cost.
I ￿nd that the magnitude of the welfare cost of in￿ ation is closely related to the value of the
price dispersion target, while it is not sensitive to how I calibrate the preference parameters.
A more dispersed price distribution implies less competition in the market, and hence, a
bigger search cost and a higher average price level. Therefore, the output and consumption
in equilibrium is driven farther away from the e¢ cient level, and the welfare cost of in￿ ation
becomes larger.
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Proof of Lemma 1.
First, we consider the case of ￿ < 1: The ￿rst order condition of the buyer￿ s unconstrained
optimization problem is u0(d￿=p)=p ￿ 1 = 0: Notice that ￿ < 1 implies ￿qu00(q)=u0(q) < 1;
so u0(d￿=p)=p is a decreasing function in p and @d￿(p)=@p < 0: Hence, there exists ^ p such
that d￿(^ p) = z for z > 0: For p < ^ p; d￿(p) > z and u0(z=p)=p ￿ 1 > 0: Buyer wants to spend
more, but is subject to the constraint d￿(p;z) ￿ z: Hence, d￿(p;z) = z for p < ^ p: For p ￿ ^ p;
d￿(p) ￿ z, and d￿(p;z) = d￿(p): It is straightforward to verify that @^ p=@z < 0:
Second, we consider the case of ￿ > 1: ￿ > 1 implies ￿qu00(q)=u0(q) > 1; so u0(d￿=p)=p is
now an increasing function in p and @d￿(p)=@p > 0: Similarly, we can show that ^ p exists such
that d￿(^ p) = z; but @^ p=@z > 0: Hence, we have d￿(p;z) = d￿(p) for p < ^ p; and d￿(p;z) = z for
p ￿ ^ p: Then, we want to establish the existence of pR and show that ^ p < pR:
I claim that the surplus from trade at ^ p is positive, i.e. u(z=^ p) ￿ z > 0: Suppose not
and u(z=^ p) ￿ z ￿ 0: u0(z=^ p)=^ p ￿ 1 = 0 holds by the de￿nition of ^ p: For all d < z; we have
u0(d=^ p)=^ p ￿ 1 > u0(z=^ p)=^ p ￿ 1 since u00(q) < 0; so u0(d=^ p)=^ p ￿ 1 > 0: Hence, for all d < z;
u(d=^ p)￿d < u(z=^ p)￿z ￿ 0. However, u(d=^ p)￿d = 0 when d = 0; and this is a contradiction.
Therefore, u(z=^ p) ￿ z > 0: For p ￿ ^ p; d￿(p;z) = z; and the buyer￿ s surplus from trade is
u(z=p) ￿ z; which is a decreasing function in p: Given that u(z=^ p) ￿ z > 0 and u(z=p) ￿ z
becomes a negative number as p approaches in￿nity, by intermediate value theorem there
must exists pR such that u(z=pR) ￿ z = 0 and pR > ^ p. It is straightforward to check that
@pR=@z > 0:
Finally, consider the case of ￿ = 1; and the utility function has the log form. Because
the price elasticity of demand is equal to one for log utility, the buyer￿ s unconstrained
optimal expenditure ~ d; which is determined by the ￿rst order condition u0(~ d=p)=p = 1;
does not depend on the price level. If ~ d ￿ z; buyer spends ~ d; and he can only spend
z if ~ d > z: Hence, d￿(p;z) = minf~ d;zg: Because minf~ d;zg does not depend on p; the
buyer￿ s surplus u(minf~ d;zg=p) ￿ minf~ d;zg decreases in p: Therefore, there exists pR such
that u(minf~ d;zg=pR) ￿ minf~ d;zg = 0, and buyer does not want to spend for p > pR: ￿
42Proof of Lemma 2.
In this proof, I use z￿ > 0 to denote the buyer￿ s optimal choice of real balance. First, we
consider the case of ￿ < 1; and assume that ^ p ￿ p at z￿: We ￿rst consider the situation in
which ^ p < p: If ^ p < p; d￿(p;z) = d￿(p) for all p 2 [p; ￿ p]: We plug it into (6) and omit all the





















￿ is the nominal interest rate. The ￿rst order condition with respect to z
evaluated at z￿ is @L=@z￿ = ￿i < 0; which is a contradiction to z￿ being the optimal real
balance. Then, we consider the situation of ^ p = p. Recall that ^ p is determined by z through
u0(z=^ p) = ^ p; so z￿ satis￿es ^ p(z￿) = p: We want to solve for @L=@z￿: When z approaches z￿













































dG(p;￿)g = ￿i < 0: On the other
hand, when z approaches z￿ from above, ^ p(z) approaches p from below, and limz!z￿
+ @L=@z =
￿i < 0: However, the fact that z￿ is the optimal real balance implies limz!z￿
￿ @L=@z ￿ 0 and
limz!z￿
+ @L=@z ￿ 0: This is a contradiction. Therefore, we must have ^ p > p when ￿ < 1:
Second, we consider the case of ￿ > 1, and assume that ^ p ￿ ￿ p at z￿: If ^ p > ￿ p; ac-
cording to Lemma 1, d￿(p;z) = d￿(p) for all p 2 [p; ￿ p]. Thus, we can similarly simplify
the buyer￿ s optimization problem to (14) and arrive at a contradiction. If ^ p(z￿) = ￿ p;
we can get limz!z￿













dG(p;￿)g = ￿i < 0; and
limz!z￿
+ @L=@z = ￿i < 0 by applying @^ p=@z > 0: This is again a contradiction. Therefore,
^ p < ￿ p must be true when ￿ > 1: ￿













(1 ￿ 2F(p))dF(p) > k:











￿ 1](2 ￿ 2F(p))dF(p) = i: (15)
It is straightforward to check that
R ^ p
p [u0(z=p)=p ￿ 1](2 ￿ 2F(p))dF(p) is monotonically de-
creasing in z; thus there is a unique z￿ satisfying (15).













(1 ￿ 2F(p))dF(p) < k:















The left hand side of the equation is again monotonically decreasing in z; so ￿￿ = 0 deter-
mines a unique z￿:
















￿(1 ￿ F(p))]dF(p) = i: (16)
and again the left hand side of the equation is monotonically decreasing in z: Hence, a unique
z￿ is determined by ￿￿: Now take z￿ as given, and ￿￿ must also satisfy (16). I use H(￿) to
denote the left hand side of (16) as a function of ￿; and @2H=@￿2 = 0: Hence, H(￿) is a
monotone function in ￿; and there is a unique ￿￿ satisfying (16) given z￿. Therefore, z￿ and
￿￿ uniquely determine each other.
We can similarly prove the statement for ￿ > 1 by replacing (7) with (9) for z￿. ￿
Proof of Lemma 4.
First, consider ￿ < 1: Given the cuto⁄ ^ p in Lemma 1, there are two cases: ￿ p ￿ ^ p or
￿ p > ^ p: If ￿ p ￿ ^ p; d￿(￿ p;z) = z; and ￿(￿ p) = z (1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ c=￿ p): Seller wants to choose a price
44as high as possible in the feasible range, and he posts ￿ p = ^ p: In the other case of ￿ p > ^ p;










￿ p2 = 0; (17)
which is the ￿rst order condition of the seller￿ s pro￿t maximization problem. We can derive








) + ~ p ￿ c = 0:
Therefore, seller wants to post the upper limit ￿ p = maxf^ p; ~ pg:
Second, consider ￿ > 1: There are again two cases: ￿ p ￿ ^ p or ￿ p > ^ p: If ￿ p ￿ ^ p, d￿(￿ p;z) =
d￿(￿ p); and it is an increasing function in ￿ p according to Lemma (1). The seller￿ s pro￿t
at ￿ p, ￿(￿ p) = d￿(￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ c=￿ p) is also increasing in ￿ p; and the seller wants to post
￿ p = ^ p: His pro￿t is then ￿(^ p) = d￿(^ p)(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ c=^ p): If ￿ p > ^ p; d￿(￿ p;z) = z and ￿(￿ p) =
z (1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ c=￿ p): The seller wants to post a price as high as possible, i.e., he chooses
￿ p = pR. He gets pro￿t ￿(pR) = z (1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ c=pR): We compare ￿(^ p) with ￿(pR); and
notice that d￿(^ p) = z and (1 ￿ c=^ p) < (1 ￿ c=pR): Therefore, ￿(^ p) < ￿(pR); and the seller
chooses to post ￿ p = pR:
Finally, if ￿ = 1; d￿(p;z) = minf~ d;zg; which does not depend on p: The seller￿ s pro￿t
function simply is
￿(￿ p) = (1 ￿ ￿
￿)
 





and @￿(￿ p)=@￿ p > 0: Therefore, the seller posts ￿ p = pR: ￿
Proof of Lemma 5.







According to Lemma 4, there is a unique price that maximizes ￿(p); so every seller posts ￿ p:
If a seller deviates by posting ￿ p0 = ￿ p+"; where " > 0; his pro￿t decreases since ￿ p maximizes
45(18) and his trade volume stays the same. Similarly, if a seller deviates to ￿ p ￿ "; his pro￿t
drops without an increase in trade volume. Therefore, there is no incentive for any seller to
deviate away from ￿ p:
If ￿￿ = 1; it is clearly an equilibrium that every seller posts p = c: There is no incentive
to post a price lower than c; since that yields a negative pro￿t. On the other hand, if a seller
deviates and posts c+"; his pro￿t ￿(c+") is equal to zero since F(c+") = 1; and he loses all
the buyers. Next, I want to argue that this is the only equilibrium of the seller￿ s price posting
game. If there is another F(p) concentrated at p0 > c; a seller has incentive to lower the price
that he posted by "; i.e. he wants to post p0 ￿ ": In this way, he can trade with a buyer for
sure even though his pro￿t from the trade decreases a little. A discrete jump in the trading
probability makes up for the in￿nitesimal drop of the pro￿t, and the seller￿ s expected pro￿t
increases. Hence, there is a pro￿table deviation and another degenerate F(p) does not exist.
If there is another nondegenerate F(p); its support ZF is connected. This conclusion follows
directly from Lemma 1 in Burdett and Judd (1983): ￿(p) must be the same for all p 2 ZF;
and in particular ￿(p) = ￿(￿ p) = (2 ￿ 2F(￿ p))(d￿(￿ p;z￿) ￿ cd￿(￿ p;z￿)=￿ p) = 0 since F(￿ p) = 1:
However, for any p such that F(p) 2 (0;1); ￿(p) = (2￿2F(p))(d￿(p;z￿) ￿ cd￿(p;z￿)=p) > 0:
This is a contradiction. Therefore, F(p) concentrated at c is the unique equilibrium price
distribution in the seller￿ s price posting game.
If ￿￿ 2 (0;1); any F(p) concentrated at p 2 [p; ￿ p] cannot be a price posting equilibrium
distribution. On the one hand, seller can always increase the price, hence increase the pro￿t,
while still keeping those buyers who only sample his price. On the other hand, seller can also
lower his price in￿nitesimally, and get a jump in the trading probability. Hence, F(p) must
be nondegenerate if ￿￿ 2 (0;1): Again from Lemma 1 in Burdett and Judd (1983); we know






















46The above equation determines a unique F(p) for each p: In particular, ￿(p) = ￿(￿ p) deter-















Proof of Proposition 1.
First, we consider the case of ￿￿ = 0: Suppose an SSME exists for an economy with
1 + ￿ > ￿: Because ￿￿ = 0; the equilibrium price distribution in the decentralized market,
F ￿(p) must be concentrated at ￿ p:
In the case of ￿ < 1; ￿ p = maxf^ p; ~ pg: If ~ p ￿ ^ p; d￿(￿ p;z￿) = d￿(~ p): The buyer￿ s optimal real
balance z￿ maximizes











Immediately, we have @L=@z￿ = ￿(1+￿￿￿) < 0; and z￿ = 0: This contradicts the existence
of a monetary equilibrium. If ^ p > ~ p; d￿(￿ p;z￿) = z￿; and z￿ maximizes










Then, @L=@z￿ = ￿(1+￿ ￿￿)+￿[u0(z￿=^ p)=^ p￿1] = ￿(1+￿ ￿￿) < 0; since u0(z￿=^ p) = ^ p by
Lemma 1. Hence, z￿ = 0 and it is again a contradiction.
In the case of ￿ ￿ 1; ￿ p = pR. The buyer￿ s optimal real balance z￿ maximizes












which can be simpli￿ed to L = ￿(1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)z since u(d￿(pR;z)=pR) ￿ d￿(pR;z) = 0 by the
de￿nition of pR in Lemma 1. Then, @L=@z￿ = ￿(1 + ￿ ￿ ￿) < 0: Therefore, there exists no
SSME with ￿￿ = 0:
Second, we consider the case of ￿￿ = 1; and assume an SSME exists. According to
Lemma 5, F ￿(p) is concentrated at c: Plugging d￿(c;z￿) and F ￿(c) = 1 into (4) and drop
unrelated terms. The buyer￿ s optimal price sampling strategy ￿￿ should maximize












47It is then obvious that @L=@￿ = ￿￿k < 0; and the buyer should choose ￿￿ = 0: This is
a contradiction to our assumption ￿￿ = 1: Therefore, there does not exist an SSME with
￿￿ = 1: ￿
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